Scotland’s First Minister John Swinney, Wales’ First Minister Rhun ap Iorwerth, and Northern Ireland’s First Minister Michelle O’Neill will meet in Cardiff, the Welsh capital, on Monday, September 14, to jointly present their parties’ positions on national self-determination and the constitutional future of each region. This is not an agreement that can directly “dissolve the United Kingdom,” but it could still mark a significant moment in British constitutional history: for the first time since the devolution of powers, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are simultaneously led by First Ministers who support secession from the current constitutional framework of the United Kingdom, and three previously separate political movements have begun to coordinate their efforts proactively. It is widely believed that the constitutional framework of the United Kingdom is currently facing a new challenge.

Different goals lead to entirely different legal paths.

The Scottish National Party seeks Scottish independence; Plaid Cymru aims for Wales to eventually become an independent nation; and Sinn Féin does not pursue “Northern Irish independence,” but rather the end of British sovereignty over Northern Ireland, with the goal of achieving Irish reunification.

Northern Ireland already has a legal mechanism for holding a “border referendum” under the Belfast Agreement; although Scotland held an independence referendum in 2014, any new referendum would still need to address the issue of authorization from Westminster; Wales is even further from holding an independence referendum, with Plaid Cymru having explicitly stated that it will not hold a direct independence referendum during this parliamentary term, opting instead to first seek the authority to determine the timing, questions, and procedures of such a referendum.

Therefore, what the three parties can truly agree on now is not a “timeline for the dissolution of the United Kingdom,” but rather a more fundamental—and far more thorny—principle: Does London have the right to indefinitely refuse to allow regions to hold referendums?

This is precisely the aspect of this alliance that should most concern the British government. For a long time, London has been able to handle three fronts separately. Scottish independence is regarded as a Scottish issue, Irish reunification has been placed within the special framework of the Belfast Agreement, and Welsh independence, due to its weaker levels of public support and political backing, is rarely even considered an imminent national-level concern.

At present, the three parties are attempting to repackage these issues into a single proposition: if the United Kingdom is indeed a “voluntarily formed union of nations,” should each of its constituent nations then possess the right to withdraw?

In recent years, the Scottish government has, in fact, been actively promoting this narrative. On September 10, Swinney once again wrote to Prime Minister Andy Burnham, calling for the so‑called principle that “the Scottish people have the right to decide their future” to be enshrined in a clear legal framework.

The political landscape of the United Kingdom has already changed.

More importantly, the political landscape has already changed. In May this year, the Scottish National Party once again became the largest party in the Scottish Parliament; meanwhile, Plaid Cymru secured the position of the largest party in the Welsh Parliament for the first time in its history, and Rhun ap Iorwerth became the first non-Labour First Minister of Wales since devolution. O’Neill, meanwhile, has long since become the first nationalist First Minister in Northern Ireland’s history.

Taken individually, none of the three is enough to cause the United Kingdom to disintegrate. However, when all three positions fall into the hands of nationalist parties at the same time, the significance is entirely different. In May of this year, O’Neill publicly stated that the three parties would strengthen cooperation and push for “constitutional change”; Sweeney also said that the “direction” toward independence and self-determination has become “very clear.”

Of course, this alliance is still far from truly reshaping the map of the United Kingdom. Wales’s social base for independence remains significantly weaker than Scotland’s; the Northern Irish government operates under a power-sharing arrangement between unionists and nationalists, and O’Neill cannot represent the entire Northern Irish executive in pushing for unification; although support for Scottish independence has long hovered around 50–50, it is still some way from achieving an overwhelming majority that London cannot ignore.

A pro-independence poll conducted by YesCymru from August 13 to 24 shows that, when undecided and non-voting respondents are excluded, 32% of likely Welsh voters would vote in favor, while 68% would vote against.

Polls in Northern Ireland also show that support for Irish reunification remains below the majority. A survey conducted in May among 1,534 voters showed that if asked tomorrow, 35.8% would vote in favor of a united Ireland, while 49.7% would not.

The three cracks began to connect with each other for the first time.

However, the problems facing the United Kingdom have already changed. The question in the past was: Will Scotland leave? In the future, it is increasingly likely to become: If Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland simultaneously demand the “right to leave,” how much longer can Westminster continue to refuse?

What truly unsettles the unionists in Britain is not the document signed on Monday, but the fact that three previously separate fissures have, for the first time, begun to converge.

Trump once again supports Irish reunification, drawing strong opposition from the British political establishment.

CCTV News quotedAccording to foreign media reports, U.S. President Trump stated again on the 13th that he supports Northern Ireland’s secession from the United Kingdom and “reunification with Ireland.” The day before, Trump had made similar remarks, which had already sparked strong opposition from the British political establishment.

On that day, Trump told the media in Ireland: “There is Northern Ireland, and there is also Ireland.” In my view, combining them seems perfectly natural. “When asked about the Scottish issue, Trump said that it would not be discussed at this time, and that it would be left for later.”

Kemi Badenoch, leader of the UK’s Conservative Party, said on social media that day: “Trump is as loose-lipped as ever, just as he was when he talked about Greenland and suggested making Canada the 51st state of the United States.” “Budnoch said, ‘Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom.’” On the same day, Nigel Farage, leader of the Reform UK party, said on social media that Northern Ireland is a proud and inseparable part of the United Kingdom.

What would England face if the United Kingdom were to fall apart?

Niu Tanqin recently wrote that Britain’s troubles are not merely due to Trump’s dismissive remarks about the prospect of Irish reunification, but rather stem from new internal issues within the UK itself—history is about to be made. For the first time in history, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have joined forces to seek independence from the United Kingdom.

For the United Kingdom, none of this is, of course, good news. It should be known that the United Kingdom was formerly known as the “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.” After Ireland gained independence, the name was changed to the “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.” Great Britain comprises the three islands of England, Scotland, and Wales. If each constituent country were to truly secede, the United Kingdom’s name would certainly have to be changed again—there’d be no need for such a long string of names; “England” alone would suffice.

In the West, some have already begun to speculate about how geopolitics would evolve if the United Kingdom were to truly fall apart. Clearly, just as Russia inherited the mantle of the Soviet Union, England will become the primary successor to the United Kingdom. Following its dissolution, England’s population would be only 15.5% smaller than that of the current United Kingdom, and its GDP would be just 13.5% lower than the UK’s current GDP.

However, England is, after all, not Russia. After losing half of its territory, England will face a series of geopolitical and economic challenges, including, but not limited to:

London will lose the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear deterrent base. The entire fleet of Britain’s nuclear-armed submarines is currently stationed at the Royal Navy base at Clyde, on Scotland’s west coast. In the foreseeable future, England has no other geographically, politically, or logistically suitable alternative deep-water ports capable of accommodating nuclear submarines. Nuclear power has never been merely a string of weapon numbers; it is deeply rooted in specific lands and geographies.

London has lost control of the GIUK Strait. GIUK stands for Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom; this line effectively controls the maritime passage from northern Europe and the Arctic Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean. During the Cold War, this was the only route Soviet submarines could take from their bases on the Kola Peninsula to reach the Atlantic Ocean. NATO deployed underwater surveillance systems here and, in conjunction with anti-submarine patrol aircraft, established a tightly sealed containment net. After the Cold War, the United Kingdom and NATO maintained control over the GIUK gap, thereby monitoring the movements of Russian submarines. The control—or loss—of a critical maritime route directly reshapes a nation’s security perimeter.

Losses from the Beihai oil and gas fields. An independent Scotland would gain ownership of the vast majority of the waters currently under British jurisdiction in the North Sea. England will lose the majority of its revenues from North Sea oil and gas reserves; moreover, England will also lose access to the substantial offshore wind energy zones located in Scottish and Welsh waters.

The emergence of the new “Western Flank.” For more than a century, the United Kingdom has assumed that its western border is completely secure. However, if Northern Ireland were to unite with the Republic of Ireland and Scotland and Wales were to secede, the Irish Sea would be entirely surrounded by foreign territory. This will create a massive security vacuum right on England’s doorstep, forcing London to redeploy its military defenses.