On July 31 (Reporter Ye Yongcheng）——On July 31, the Japanese government officially announced the establishment of the National Intelligence Service. Some interviewed experts pointed out that the Japanese National Intelligence Service and the "special armour" of the militarism period before World War II have many core characteristics. They also criticized the establishment of the bureau by the Gao Zaomiao government, pointing out that the boundaries of intelligence activities are blurred, checks and balances are weak, and there are risks of abuse of power and loss of control.

Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi,

July 31, JapanChen Yang, Affairs Scholar and Researcher of Chahar Societytelling the china news service in hong kong, comparing the japanese national intelligence service with the "tekoko" of the militarist era, intelligence forces are highly concentrated in the two countries. The establishment of the bureau integrates the intelligence collection systems of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the National Police Agency, breaking the previous departmental barriers and forming a centrally controlled intelligence center. This is completely consistent with the concept of "privileged cabinet" breaking through local constraints and integrating intelligence forces through centralization.

Secondly, both have internal and external control functions. "Tejia" was initially responsible for domestic ideological control and suppression of Japan's anti-war forces, and later expanded to foreign intelligence infiltration. Japan's first National Intelligence Director, Mr. Hara, has also been deeply involved in Japan's domestic security and public opinion control for a long time, giving the agency dual capabilities of internal surveillance and external reconnaissance.

In both cases, there are obvious loopholes in power supervision. The Kaohsiung city government set up the bureau, but did not set up an independent third-party oversight body. The legislature only retains the right to report after the fact, so that the boundaries of intelligence activities are blurred, checks and balances are weak, power is easily abused, and the hidden danger of losing control in the era of "secret agents" is repeated.

It is widely believed that Japan is breaking through its defense principles and establishing an intelligence hub as a prelude to military intervention and geopolitical maneuvering. At the same time, the agency can rely on the intelligence network for cognitive public opinion penetration and high-tech intelligence collection as a strategic layout service for the main forces. This practice is actually fully in line with Japan's militaristic "intelligence priority" policy before World War II, and deserves close attention from neighboring countries and the international community.

The Japanese parliament building.

Next, how Japan's "Espionage Prevention Law" defines concepts such as "espionage", "foreign interference" and "foreign influence", and whether the Japanese Diet can truly review secrets and independently investigate the illegal behavior of intelligence agencies, deserves attention. Chen Yang pointed out that if the Prime Minister's leadership highly concentrates intelligence, expands the anti-espionage law, and the third-party supervision is insufficient, intelligence forces will penetrate beyond the field of national security and gradually expand to political activities, social organizations, and personal privacy.

Some public opinion is concerned about whether Japan's National Intelligence Service will intensify intelligence competition between countries. In this regard, Chen Yang believes that Japan's move is aimed at integrating scattered intelligence resources, reducing dependence on US intelligence supplies, and independently supporting security decisions. This will profoundly reshape the security ecosystem of East Asia, continuously increase the risk of regional intelligence competition, and even bury long-term security risks.

From a regional perspective, many East Asian countries have intertwined geopolitical interests, Japan's foreign intelligence forces continue to expand, and neighboring countries will be forced to upgrade their counter-espionage and foreign intelligence defense systems, making intelligence offensive and defensive competition increasingly normal. In addition, the intelligence game is characterized by concealment and low obstacles, which easily leads to misjudgment. Once the intelligence friction and lack of mature crisis management channels, will continue to erode regional security and mutual trust. Against the background of Japan's failure to completely solve the history of aggression and the continuous rise of right-wing forces, the gradual formation of the central intelligence system, coupled with continuous military expansion, has triggered security concerns among neighboring countries.

In the long run, the existing security balance in East Asia, based on the post-war order, continues to be disturbed. Relying only on expanding intelligence capabilities cannot really improve the security environment; on the contrary, it can easily lead to a vicious circle of arms and intelligence competition. Chen Yang said that countries in the region should be highly vigilant, advocate the establishment of a transparent communication mechanism, rely on multilateral dialogue to mediate differences, resist alliance confrontation and intelligence militarization, and maintain lasting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.